Theories of Rebellion

Edward N. Muller and Erich Weede
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Edward N. Muller: University of Arizona
Erich Weede: Universität zu Köln

Rationality and Society, 1994, vol. 6, issue 1, 40-57

Abstract: Hypotheses to explain cross-national variation in levels of rebellious political conflict can be grounded principally either in relative deprivation assumptions of frustration-aggression theory or in expected utility assumptions or rational choice theory. Previous theory and research have tended to focus exclusively on one or the other approach or else have combined the two eclectically. To evaluate the validity of these competing theories in comparative macrosocietal research, it is necessary to formulate alternative models that can be confronted empirically. Equations for a relative deprivation model and a power contention model (grounded in rational action assumptions) are specified here and a test of the models is conducted with quantitative cross-national data. The results support the predictions of the power contention model.

Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:6:y:1994:i:1:p:40-57

DOI: 10.1177/1043463194006001004

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