The Political Economy of Military Rule in Nigeria

John F. E. Ohiorhenuan
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John F. E. Ohiorhenuan: Department of Economics, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

Review of Radical Political Economics, 1984, vol. 16, issue 2-3, 1-27

Abstract: This paper examines the theme of the postcolonial state in the context of Nigeria under military rule. Rule by force of arms would appear to establish a strong primafacie case of "relative autonomy." Furthermore, the state was able to appropriate directly a large part of the economy's surplus in the form of tribute from the petroleum industry, especially since the 1973 oil crisis. Military rule in an oil revenue state provides a unique opportunity for examining the thesis that the state is relatively autonomous in a postcolonial context. It is shown that military power and oil revenue did give Nigerian rulers considerable discretion but that discretion had to be exercised within, and was therefore determined by, particular social relations of production. In the end, the interests of capital prevailed. The general validity of the autonomy of the postcolonial state thesis is doubtful.

Date: 1984
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