Ghana’s Competitive Clientelism and Space for Long-Term Stable Policies

Michael Ehis Odijie and Mohammed Zayan Imoro

SAGE Open, 2021, vol. 11, issue 3, 21582440211031513

Abstract: Given the close election results and the winner-takes-all nature of politics in Ghana, researchers have argued that the two parties are now characterized by a high degree of vulnerability, which in turn provides strong incentives for ruling elites in both parties to find strategies to ensure their political survival. This results in the distribution of state resources to political supporters and short-termism, which weakens the possibility of building a broad political consensus on any national development issues. Using the case of Ghana’s Right to Information Bill, this article will argue that there are conditions under which elite commitment to long-term development could be fostered and sustained in competitive clientelist political settings like Ghana.

Keywords: Ghana; competitive clientelism; Right to Information; civil society (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:sagope:v:11:y:2021:i:3:p:21582440211031513

DOI: 10.1177/21582440211031513

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