Corporate Governance, Ultimate Owner, and Target Cash Holdings: Evidence From China

Khalil Jebran, Shihua Chen, Muhammad Zubair Tauni and Hassan Ahmad

SAGE Open, 2019, vol. 9, issue 4, 2158244019894293

Abstract: This study investigates the influence of corporate governance and the nature of the ultimate owner on the adjustment behavior of corporate cash holdings. This study uses a sample of Chinese listed firms over the period 2003–2016 and opts difference- and system-GMM (generalized method of moments) models to explore the target cash holdings of Chinese firms. The results demonstrate that Chinese firms have target cash holdings and that the cash holdings adjustment behavior varies across the state-owned enterprises and nonstate-owned enterprises. Finally, the results show that cash holdings adjustment rate varies across normal and crisis period. This study adds to the existing literature by showing how corporate governance attributes and the nature of ownership can impact the cash holdings. Finally, this study provides insights that the cash holdings adjustment varies in normal and a crisis period.

Keywords: target cash holdings; trade-off theory; ultimate owner; corporate governance; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:sagope:v:9:y:2019:i:4:p:2158244019894293

DOI: 10.1177/2158244019894293

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