A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms

Luca Corazzini, Marco Faravelli and Luca Stanca

No 714, CRIEFF Discussion Papers from Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm

Abstract: This paper investigates fund-raising mechanisms based on a prize as a way to overcome free riding in the private provision of public goods, under the assumptions of income heterogeneity and incomplete information about income levels. We compare experimentally the performance of a lottery, an all-pay auction and a benchmark voluntary contribution mechanism. We find that prize-based mechanisms perform better than voluntary contribution in terms of public good provision after accounting for the cost of the prize. Comparing the prize-based mechanisms, total contributions are significantly higher in the lottery than in the all-pay auction. Focusing on individual income types, the lottery outperforms voluntary contributions and the all-pay auction throughout the income distribution

Keywords: Auctions; Lotteries; Public Goods; Laboratory Experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D44 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Prize To Give For: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms (2010)
Working Paper: A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms (2007)
Working Paper: A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:san:crieff:0714

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