Can relief measures nudge compliance in a public health crisis? Evidence from a kinked fiscal policy rule

Claudio Deiana, Andrea Geraci, Gianluca Mazzarella and Fabio Sabatini

No 214, Working Papers in Public Economics from Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma

Abstract: We show that compensation measures aimed at improving the fairness of the pandemic policy response can unintendedly nudge compliance with restrictive orders. We combine information on the distribution of resources with data tracking citizens' movements through mobile devices and navigation systems across Italian municipalities. To assess the impact of relief measures on compliance, we exploit a sharp kink schedule in the allocation of funds. The empirical analysis provides evidence that mobility decreased with transfers, suggesting that the observance of emergency rules also depends on the fairness of the pandemic policy response.

Keywords: Compliance; Mobility; Social capital; COVID-19 policy response; Stay-at home orders; Lockdown; Regression Kink Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 H30 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2021-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-hea and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Can relief measures nudge compliance in a public health crisis? Evidence from a kinked fiscal policy rule (2022)
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