Promises and Partner-Switch

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Martin Dufwenberg and Stefano Papa

No 215, Working Papers in Public Economics from Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma

Abstract: Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one's word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we however argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.

Keywords: Promises; Partner-switching, Expectations, Commitment, Guilt, Informal agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C91 D01 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2021-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Promises and partner-switch (2023)
Working Paper: Promises and Partner-Switch (2021)
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