The relative effectiveness of EU national and supranational fiscal rules

Melisso Boschi, Alessandro Girardi and Marco Ventura

No 222, Working Papers in Public Economics from Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma

Abstract: Given the EU economic governance, where two layers of fiscal rules co-exist at the supranational and national levels, this paper offers an empirical assessment of the additional impact of national frameworks, compared to EU level ones, on EU countries' budgetary outcomes. Building on the staggered difference-in-differences approach, we quantify the negligible benefits for budgetary discipline stemming from national fiscal rules when supranational ones are already in place.

Keywords: Fiscal rules; European Union; Staggered Difference-in-Differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 C23 H61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10
Date: 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec
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