Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation

Ann B. Gillette, Thomas Noe () and Michael J. Rebello

OFRC Working Papers Series from Oxford Financial Research Centre

Abstract: We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally pre- ferred policies more frequently but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsider-controlled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider, adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board de-signs where the efficient Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria.

Pages: 36
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-ppm
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Related works:
Journal Article: Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation (2008)
Working Paper: Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation (2007)
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