Relative Payoffs and Evolutionary Spite --- Evolutionary Equilibria in Games with Finitely Many Players

Christiane Clemens and Thomas Riechmann

No 98, Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 from Society for Computational Economics

Keywords: Evolutionary Games; Evolutionary Equilibria; Spiteful Behavior; Relative Payoff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-08-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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