Caution or Activism? Monetary Policy Strategies in an Open Economy

Martin Ellison, Lucio Sarno and Jouko Vilmunen

No 214, Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: We examine optimal policy in an open-economy model with uncertainty and learning, where monetary policy actions affect the economy through the real exchange rate channel. Our results show that the degree of caution or activism in optimal policy depends on whether central banks are in coordinated or uncoordinated equilibrium. If central banks coordinate their policy actions then activism is optimal. In contrast, if there is no coordination then caution prevails. In the latter case caution is optimal because it helps central banks to avoid exposing themselves to manipulative actions by other central banks

Keywords: open economy; learning; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 E52 F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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http://repec.org/sce2006/up.21223.1140691456.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: CAUTION OR ACTIVISM? MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES IN AN OPEN ECONOMY (2007)
Working Paper: Caution or Activism? Monetary Policy Strategies in an Open Economy (2007)
Working Paper: Caution or Activism? Monetary Policy Strategies in an Open Economy (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecfa:214

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