Access Profit-Sharing Regulation with Information Transmission and Acquisition

Francesca Stroffolini ()
Additional contact information
Francesca Stroffolini: University of Napoli “Federico II” and CSEF

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: The paper analyses how information acquisition and transmission issues affect the determination of the optimal access pro.t-sharing plan in regulated network industries. It considers a regulated upstream monopoly with cost uncertainty and a downstream unregulated duopoly. It will be shown that, under an access price cap regulatory mechanism, the transfer of a sufficiently high share of access profits to consumers induces an integrated upstream monopolist to transmit to his downstream rival the information privately acquired on the upstream cost and this, in turn, may negatively affect welfare. On account of these effects the optimal access profit-sharing plan will depend on the variance and shape of cost distribution, on information acquisition costs as well as on the regulator’s redistributive concerns.

Keywords: Access price cap regulation; profit-sharing; information transmission and acquisition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Research in Economics, 2012, 66(2), 161-174

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.csef.it/WP/wp214.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:214

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dr. Maria Carannante ().