A Limit Theorem for Equilibria under Ambiguous Beliefs Correspondences

Giuseppe De Marco and Maria Romaniello (mromanie@unina.it)
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Maria Romaniello: Università di Napoli Federico II

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: Previous literature shows that, in many different models, limits of equilibria of perturbed games are equilibria of the unperturbed game when the sequence of perturbed games converges to the unperturbed one in an appropriate sense. The question whether such limit property extends to the equilibrium notions in ambiguous games is not yet clear as it seems; in fact, previous literature shows that the extension fails in simple examples. The contribution in this paper is to show that the limit property holds for equilibria under ambiguous beliefs correspondences (presented by the authors in a previous paper). Key for our result is the sequential convergence assumption imposed on the sequence of beliefs correspondences. Counterexamples show why this assumption cannot be removed.

Keywords: Ambiguous games; beliefs correspondences; limit equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, Vol. 66(3), pp. 431–438

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Related works:
Journal Article: A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences (2013)
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