 Coups d'état and Defense Spending: A Counterfactual AnalysisVincenzo Bove and Roberto Nisticò () CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy Abstract: We present a case study analysis of the impact of coups d'état on defence spending. We use the synthetic control method and compare the evolution of the defence burden for countries affected by coups with the evolution of an artificial control group. We find that successful coups determine a large increase in defence burden, as they directly affect the bargaining power of the military. When no effects or a decrease in the defence burden is found, it is often the consequence of a democratisation process triggered by the coup. Failed coups, instead, produce a smaller, and mostly positive, effect on military burden, possibly a result of coup-proofing strategies. The presence of country-specific dynamics calls for in-depth analyses of single units, to detect particular mechanisms that are averaged out in the aggregate. Keywords: Military Expenditure; Coups d'état; Synthetic Control Method (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Public Choice, 2014, vol. 161 (3-4), pp. 321-344 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:366 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy Contact information at EDIRC. |
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