Lobbying (Strategically Appointed) Bureaucrats

Marco Sorge

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: When are strategic appointments useful in curbing policy bias from ex-post negotiation between state agencies and special interest groups? Bertelli and Feldmann (Jnl. of Public Admin. Research and Theory, 2007) provide an insightful analysis of the issue within a full information model of presidential appointments. This paper examines whether and how their findings extend to a world of policy uncertainty and asymmetric information, which rationalizes delegation in the first place. We establish that the existence of non-zero impact of lobbying crucially relies on interest groups' leverage over the appointment game between higher-level institutions. Remarkably, bureaucratic lobbying may prove highly non-neutral with separated powers even when a candidate agency is agreed upon. In some circumstances (e.g., recess appointments in the U.S.), by contrast, strategic appointments fully offset interest group influence in either form of government (unified versus divided), a finding in line with the conventional theory of delegation.

Keywords: Legislative delegation; Strategic appointments; Bureaucratic lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-cta
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Published in Constitutional Political Economy, 2015, 26(2): 171-189.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:380

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