Global Arms Trade and Oil Dependence

Vincenzo Bove, Claudio Deiana () and Roberto Nisticò ()

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: We provide novel empirical models of the arms trade and focus on the role of energy dependence, in particular of oil, in explaining the trade of weapons between countries. Dramatic geopolitical events such as wars can cause significant disruptions in the supply of oil and increase oil prices. Oil-dependent economies have therefore incentives to provide security by selling or giving away arms to oil-rich countries and reduce the risk of instability. We find strong empirical support for this claim using data on international transfers of major weapons and information on global and local oil dependence, oil reserves and oil discoveries.

Keywords: Arms Trade; Oil; Security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F50 H56 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09-03, Revised 2018-02-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene
Note: A former version of this paper was circulated under the title "Energy (in)security and the Arms Trade"
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published in The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 2018, 34(2): 272-299

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.csef.it/WP/wp452.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Global Arms Trade and Oil Dependence (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:452

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dr. Maria Carannante ().