Stable Sets for Exchange Economies with Interdependent Preferences

Maria Graziano, Claudia Meo () and Nicholas C. Yannelis ()
Additional contact information
Claudia Meo: Università di Napoli Federico II
Nicholas C. Yannelis: University of Iowa

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: We introduce the notion of stable sets with externalities and address the existence problem. The importance of this solution concept is related to the fact that the existence of core allocations for exchange economies is not in general assured in a framework with more than two traders.

Keywords: Stable sets; interdependent preferences; core; types of agents. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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http://www.csef.it/WP/wp461.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:461

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