Deliberative Institutions and Optimality

Jérôme Mathis (), Marcello Puca and Simone M. Sepe ()
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Jérôme Mathis: Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, and LEDa.
Simone M. Sepe: University of Arizona, Toulouse School of Economics, and ECGI

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: We derive necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve efficiency in common interest deliberative games. Our model explicitly characterizes a large class of deliberative institutions where privately informed agents strategically deliberate before taking a decision. Under the model's information structure, the transmission of information may require interpretation from agents with specific knowledge. The dynamics of interpretation are suggestive of a variety of frictions in information transmission. Private information is aggregated, and efficient decisions are taken at equilibrium, if and only if deliberative institutions enable the agents to extend deliberation (consensual extension) and freely interact with one another (freedom of reach). When, instead, these conditions do not hold, deliberation is incomplete and “anything goes”: no general conclusion can be drawn as efficiency depends on the details of the deliberative extended-form game. We substantiate some of the implications of this indeterminacy result through detailed examples.

Keywords: Dynamic group communication; Collective choice; Strategic deliberation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05-28, Revised 2021-06-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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