Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization

Ritesh Jain and (ritesh@econ.sinica.edu.tw) and Michele Lombardi
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Ritesh Jain and: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica.

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity, due to Oury and Tercieux (2012), fully characterizes the class of social choice functions that are implementable in interim correlated rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash equilibrium) strategies.

Keywords: temporary contracts; young workers; flexibility; institutional reforms; employment protection legislation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:645

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