The Value of Consensus. An Experimental Analysis of Costly Deliberation

Marcello Puca, Krista Saral and Simone M. Sepe ()
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Simone M. Sepe: University of Arizona, Center for the Philosophy of Freedom, Université Toulouse 1 Capitole, TSE, and ECGI

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: Combining theory and experiments, we examine decision-making with endogenous deliberation across different voting rules: consensus and veto unanimity, and simple majority. Before voting, asymmetrically informed agents choose whether to engage in potentially costly communication to aggregate their private information. In line with existing studies, we find that free communication minimizes differences in decision-making across rules. In contrast, with costly communication, differences in decision-making re-emerge as the voting rules affect communication and private information aggregation. Consensus unanimity frequently outperforms the other rules because it induces more communication among agents. This work provides a new rationale for the legitimacy of the commonly used consensus unanimity voting rule in jury trials.

Keywords: Group Decision-Making; Voting Rules; Endogenous Communication; Costly Communication; Experts; Juries; Economic Experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
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