Gender Quota Laws and Violence Against Politicians. An unintended backlash

Anna Laura Baraldi (), Giovanni Immordino, Erasmo Papagni and Marco Stimolo ()
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Anna Laura Baraldi: University of Campania Luigi Vanvitelli
Marco Stimolo: Università di Siena

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of Italy's Law 215/2012 - mandating gender quotas in municipal councils - on organized-crime attacks against local politicians. Using a staggered difference-in-differences across municipalities with 5,000-15,000 residents, we find that the probability of at least one attack rises by 1.5 p.p. and total attacks increase by 1%. These results are concentrated exclusively in regions where organized crime originated. This pattern is plausibly explained by a rise in council quality: by reducing men's slots, the reform intensifies competition and rises male politicians' quality. This quality upgrade raises reservation bribes, making bribery less effective and intimidation more attractive. Consistent with this mechanism, violence rises against men but not women, as a consequence of the reform's positive effect on the average quality of male - but not female - councilors. In line with this quality upgrade, administrative capacity also improves, as measured by the Municipal Administration Quality Index.

Keywords: Gender balance laws; Organized crime; Violence; Politicians' quality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11-10, Revised 2025-11-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-law and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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