Mejorar y quedarse. La cesión de tierra a rentas por debajo del equilibrio en la Valencia del siglo XIX
Samuel Garrido
Documentos de Trabajo de la Sociedad de Estudios de Historia Agraria from Sociedad de Estudios de Historia Agraria
Abstract:
By custom, in several different regions of Europe tenants were the owners of the improvements they carried out on the farm. As a result of such customs, rents usually remained below the Ricardian equilibrium over long periods of time and therefore cannot be used to calculate the total factor productivity in agriculture. This paper examines the logic underlying the functioning of the custom that came into being in nineteenth-century Valencia. This is followed by a brief comparison between the Valencia custom, the Irish tenant right and the French mauvais gré.
Keywords: tenants; improvements; property rights; Valencia; mauvais gré (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 N53 N54 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:seh:wpaper:1009
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