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Ultimatum game: A meta-analysis of the past three decades of experimental research

Jean-Christian Tisserand

No 802032, Proceedings of International Academic Conferences from International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences

Abstract: The ultimatum game undoubtely lists the largest experimental literature of the past three decades. In this article, we focus on the choice of the proposer of the ultimatum game and the explanatory variables that may influence the amount offered. We perform a meta-analysis with a total of 97 observations from simple ultimatum game gathered through 42 articles published between 1983 and 2012. While the theoretical prediction announces that the equilibrium offer should be zero, our results show that the weighted average offer is 42.3% of the amount at stake. Among the numerous variables studied, only being an economist has a significant impact on the amounts offered.

Keywords: Meta-analysis; Ultimatum game; Experimental economics; Microeconomics; Behavioral economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 1 page
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 13th International Academic Conference, Antibes, Oct 2014, pages 631-631

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sek:iacpro:0802032

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