Optimal leniency programe for cartel abuses - an US and European perspective

Aleksander Maziarz ()
Additional contact information
Aleksander Maziarz: Kozminski University

No 6709856, Proceedings of International Academic Conferences from International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences

Abstract: Leniency is a program which gives immunity from fines or reduction of fines in cartel cases for those companies which decide to cooperate with antitrust agencies. The leniency program significantly reduces the difficulties, time and administrative costs of evidence of cartel violations, as the antitrust bodies receives assistance through leniency applications and further cooperation of cartel participant during the administrative procedure. Thanks to this, the antitrust bodies can detect and punish more cartels focusing on other abuses.Recently leniency programs are being misused because the same companies apply for leniency many times without being punished. Therefore, the program needs changes. The paper analyses US and European leniency programs and tries to find optimal solution for elimination of misuse of leniency.

Keywords: cartel; restrictive agreement; leniency; immunity form fines (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 1 page
Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 41st International Academic Conference, Venice, Oct 2018, pages 126-126

Downloads: (external link)
https://iises.net/proceedings/41st-international-a ... =67&iid=023&rid=9856 First version, 2018

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sek:iacpro:6709856

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Proceedings of International Academic Conferences from International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klara Cermakova ().