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Strategic Behavior as the Cause of Business Cycles

Jan Vorlicek () and Klara Cermakova ()
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Jan Vorlicek: College of Business and Law
Klara Cermakova: University of Economics in Prague

International Journal of Economic Sciences, 2017, vol. 6, issue 1, 33-40

Abstract: This paper is aimed to present theory of ?natural strategic cycles? showing that the cyclical development of economic performance (among other causes economic theory has been processed) can be caused also by cyclical evolution of the proportions of various strategies used by different actors in society. We use game theory as theoretical background. The existence of various games gives us an explanation of why there are so many different cycles with different duration. We assume that the theory of strategic cycle can be used to explain e.g. speculative bubble on stock exchange or long-term cycles that are still somehow difficult to grasp.

Keywords: Business cycles; strategic cycles; games theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 E03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sek:jijoes:v:6:y:2017:i:1:p:33-40

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