Antidumping Constraints and Trade Elimination

Aleš Černý and Nicolas Schmitt

Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), 1995, vol. 131, issue III, 441-452

Abstract: This article investigates the international duopoly equilibrium when two countries impose antidumping constraints. It shows that, depending on the parameters of the model, three Nash equilibria exist: one in which both firms trade, one in which no firm trades and one in which a single firm trades.

Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ses:arsjes:1995-iii-10

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