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Buyer Power in International Markets

Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

Abstract: This paper investigates the implications for international markets of the existence of retailers/wholesalers with market power. Two main results are shown. First, in the presence of buyer power trade liberalization may lead to retail market concentration. Due to this concentration retail prices may be higher and welfare may be lower in free trade than in autarky, thus reversing the standard e¤ects of trade liberalization. Second, the pro-competitive effects of trade liberalization are weaker under buyer power than under seller power.

Keywords: buyer power; retailing; international trade. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F15 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-int and nep-mic
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http://www.sfu.ca/repec-econ/sfu/sfudps/dp07-23.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Buyer power in international markets (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Buyer Power in International Markets (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Buyer Power in International Markets (2008) Downloads
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