The Social and Ecological Determinants of Common Pool Resource Sustainability

Erik Kimbrough and Alexander Vostroknutov ()
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Alexander Vostroknutov: Maastricht University

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

Abstract: We study a novel, repeated common pool resource game in which current resource stocks depend on resource extraction in previous periods. Our model shows that for a sufficiently high regrowth rate, there is no commons dilemma: the resource will be preserved indefinitely in equilibrium. Lower growth rates lead to depletion. Laboratory tests of the model indicate that favorable ecological characteristics are necessary but insufficient to encourage effective CPR governance. However, using a method developed in Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2013), we identify behavioral types ex ante by observing individual willingness to follow a costly rule, and we show that assortative matching on type facilitates CPR management.

Keywords: cooperation; common pool resource game; rule-following; experimental economics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-evo and nep-exp
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Journal Article: The social and ecological determinants of common pool resource sustainability (2015)
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