Kinship, Fractionalization and Corruption

Mahsa Akbari (), Duman Bahrami-Rad () and Erik Kimbrough
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Duman Bahrami-Rad: Simon Fraser University, https://sites.google.com/site/dumanb/

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

Abstract: By shaping patterns of relatedness and interaction, marriage practices influence the relative returns to norms of nepotism/favoritism versus norms of impartial cooperation. In-marriage (e.g. consanguineous marriage) yields a relatively closed society of related individuals and thereby encourages favoritism and corruption. Out-marriage creates a relatively open society with increased interaction between non-relatives and strangers, thereby encouraging impartiality. We report a robust association between in-marriage practices and corruption across countries and across Italian provinces. A stylized corruption experiment comparing subjects from two countries with divergent marriage patterns provides complementary evidence that the degree of impartiality varies with marriage patterns.

Keywords: corruption; fractionalization; institutions; mating patterns; consanguinity; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D0 D7 J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 102
Date: 2017-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Journal Article: Kinship, fractionalization and corruption (2019)
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