Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency

Matthew Gould () and Matthew Rablen
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Matthew Gould: Westminster Business School, University of Westminster

No 2016009, Working Papers from The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics

Abstract: The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is critical to globalpeace and security, yet more than twenty years of negotiations over itsreform have proved fruitless. We use recent advances in the theory ofa-priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of theimplications for democratic equity and efficiency of the “structuralreforms” contained within eleven current reform proposals, as well asthe separate effect of expansion of the UNSC membership. Only tworeform proposals – the EU acting as a single entity, or a weakening ofthe veto power for Permanent Members – robustly dominate the statusquo against our measures of equity and efficiency. Several proposedstructural reforms may actually worsen the issues they ostensiblyclaim to resolve.

Keywords: United Nations; United Nations Security Council; United Nations SecurityCouncil reform; equity; efficiency; voting power; square-root rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C71 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/economics/research/serps/articles/2016_009 First version, December 2016 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Reform of the United Nations Security Council: equity and efficiency (2017)
Working Paper: Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency (2014)
Working Paper: Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shf:wpaper:2016009

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