Can Risk Averse Private Entrepreneurs Efficiently Produce Low Income Housing?

Paul Makdissi () and Quentin Wodon

Cahiers de recherche from Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke

Abstract: Under rent ceilings and quality doors for low income housing units, imperfect information on the ability of tenants to pay their rent may lead the decentralized production of housing units by risk averse private entrepreneurs to be inefficient. A coordinating agency and/or subsidies for new tenants would help to produce more housing, thereby increasing the profits for landlords while also enabling more low income households to find housing.

Keywords: Low Income Housing; Risk Aversion; Rent Control; Public Good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 R31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo and nep-ure
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http://gredi.recherche.usherbrooke.ca/wpapers/04_06_pm.pdf First version, 2004 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shr:wpaper:04-06

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