A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value

Noemí Navarro and Andrés Perea (a.perea@maastrichtuniversity.nl)
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Andrés Perea: Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University

Cahiers de recherche from Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke

Abstract: We consider situations where the cooperation and negotiation possibilities between pairs of agents are given by an undirected graph. Every connected component of agents has a value, which is the total surplus the agents can generate by working together. We present a simple, sequential, bilateral bargaining procedure, in which at every stage the two agents in a link (i, j) bargain about their share from cooperation in the connected component they are part of. We show that, if the marginal value of a link is increasing in the number of links in the connected component it belongs to, then this procedure yields exactly the Myerson value payoff (Myerson, 1977) for every player.

Keywords: Myerson value; networks; bargaining; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2010-11-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://gredi.recherche.usherbrooke.ca/wpapers/GREDI-1029.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shr:wpaper:10-29

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