Federalism and Accountability with Distorted Election Choices

Sebastian Kessing

Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge from Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht

Abstract: This study analyzes the interaction between distorted election choices and the architecture of government with a focus on the implications for the accountability of politicians. Contrasting centralized with decentralized political systems, it is shown that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election choices are subject to small random distortions. Furthermore, equity and efficiency arguments for uniform policies in centralized systems are derived as these are likely to result in the better overall performance of politicians and in more equal performance across regions.

Keywords: accountability; federalism; decentralization; retrospective voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.wiwi.uni-siegen.de/vwl/repec/sie/papers/130-09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Federalism and accountability with distorted election choices (2010)
Working Paper: Federalism and Accountability with Distorted Election Choices (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sie:siegen:130-09

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