Why Are All Communist Countries Dictatorial?

C.Y. Cyrus Chu () and Meng-Yu Liang ()
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C.Y. Cyrus Chu: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, https://www.econ.sinica.edu.tw/
Meng-Yu Liang: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, https://www.econ.sinica.edu.tw/

No 22-A002, IEAS Working Paper : academic research from Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan

Abstract: Suppose that people in a capitalist society order policies mainly by comparing their wealth changes induced by various policies. We show that property prices play the role of aligning individual preferences, which naturally modifies the axiom of universal domain of the social decision function. Under reasonable and testable assumptions, we prove that this alignment effect eliminates the possibility of Condorcet Cycles (Condorce 1785) and warrants the transitivity of the majority voting mechanism. Taking away private property will reinstitute Condorcet Cycles, returning the inescapable conclusion of a dictatorial social decision rule, as claimed by Arrow (1951). Our result provides partial support to the practices of voting eligibility tests implemented in many democratic countries.

Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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