A note on separability and intra-household resource allocation in a collective household model
Tomoki Fujii and
Ryuichiro Ishikawa
No 06-2012, Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics
Abstract:
We consider a collective model of a household in which earn member has a utility function satisfying the weak separability condition. We show that the separability at the individual level carries over to the household level and that the allocation of private goods in any Pareto-efficient allocation can be supported as a Pareto-efficient allocation of the private sub-problem. We also provide the necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto weight for the private sub-problem to move in the same direction as the household Pareto weight.
Keywords: Collective model; Intro-household resource allocation; Bargaining; Separability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D01 D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series
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Journal Article: A note on separability and intra-household resource allocation in a collective household model (2013) 
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