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On Measuring Influence in Non-Binary Voting Games

Vincent C H Chua () and C H Ueng ()
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Vincent C H Chua: School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University
C H Ueng: Victoria Junior College

No 25-2004, Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics

Abstract: In this note, we demonstrate using two simple examples that generalization of the Banzhaf measure of voter influence to non-binary voting games that requires as starting position a voter’s membership in a winning coalition is likely to incompletely reflect the influence a voter has on the outcome of a game. Generalization of the Banzhaf measure that takes into consideration all possible pivot moves of a voter including those moves originating from a losing coalition will, on the other hand, result in a measure that is proportional to the Penrose measure only in the ternary case.

Keywords: Penrose measure; Banzhaf index; ternary games; multicandidate weighted voting games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2004-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-pol and nep-sea
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Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series

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