Exit Strategies and Trade Dynamics in Repo Markets

Aleksander Berentsen, Sébastien Kraenzlin and Benjamin Müller

No 2015-09, Working Papers from Swiss National Bank

Abstract: How can a central bank control interest rates in an environment with large excess reserves? In this paper, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of a secured money market and calibrate it to the Swiss franc repo market to study this question. The theoretical model allows us to identify the factors that determine demand and supply of central bank reserves, the money market rate and trading activity in the money market. In addition, we simulate various instruments that a central bank can use to exit from unconventional monetary policy. These instruments are assessed with respect to the central bank's ability to control the money market rate, their impact on the trading activity and the operational costs of an exit. All exit instruments allow central banks to attain an interest rate target. However, the trading activity differs significantly among the instruments and central bank bills and reverse repos are the most cost-effective.

Keywords: Exit strategies; money market; repo; monetary policy; interest rates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 E40 E50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-fmk, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:snb:snbwpa:2015-09

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