Irreversibility and Monitoring in Dynamic Games: Experimental Evidence

Andrew Choi (), Syngjoo Choi, Yves Gueron () and Eungik Lee ()

Working Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University

Abstract: This paper provides experimental evidence on the impacts of irreversibility and imperfect monitoring on the efficiency and the equity of repeated public goods game. We find that irreversibility and imperfect monitoring both lead to inefficient and unequal outcomes through different channels. Irreversibility lowers public goods contribution in earlier periods and makes the initial-period contribution gap between two players long-lasting. Imperfect monitoring hampers conditional cooperation and reduces group contribution persistently. A finite mixture estimation with conditional cooperator provides a coherent account of the treatment effects.

Keywords: repeated games; dynamic games; imperfect monitoring; irreversibility; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no133

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