The Time-Inconsistency Factor: How Banks Adapt to their Mix of Savers

Carolina Laureti () and Ariane Szafarz

No 12-035, Working Papers CEB from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: This paper starts from a puzzle. On the one hand, the literature documents that a large proportion of poor people are ready to forgo interest on rigid – or commitment – savings accounts to discipline their future selves. On the other, our stylized facts from Bangladesh show that microfinance institutions pay a premium on commitment savings with respect to flexible savings. To address this puzzle, we build an equilibrium model in which a monopolistic bank offers flexible and commitment savings accounts to both rational and time-inconsistent agents. Two factors concur to explain why the bank may find it optimal to pay a commitment premium even though time-inconsistent savers do not necessarily demand one. First, the bank needs commitment accounts to meet its reserve requirements. Second, it cannot segment its clientele ex ante, and rational savers demand compensation for commitment. Last, we discuss the consequences of our findings from a regulatory perspective.

Keywords: Savings; banks; microfinance; commitment; flexibility; present-bias; hyperbolic discounting; Bangladesh (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D91 G21 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 p.
Date: 2012-12-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cbe, nep-dge and nep-mfd
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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