Selectivity and Transparency in Social Banking: Evidence from Europe

Simon Cornee, Panu Kalmi and Ariane Szafarz

No 15-047, Working Papers CEB from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: How do social banks signal their social commitment to motivated funders? This paper hypothesizes that two main channels are used, namely selectivity and transparency. We test these predictions using a rich dataset comprising balance-sheet information on 5,000 European banks over the 1998-2013 period. The results suggest that social screening leads social banks to higher project selectivity compared with mainstream banks. Social banks also tend to be more transparent than other banks. However, combining selectivity and transparency can result in excess liquidity. Overall, the empirical findings not only confirm our theoretical hypotheses, but also raise challenging issues on the management of social banks.

Keywords: Social banks; Social enterprises; Social mission; European banks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D82 G21 L31 L33 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 p.
Date: 2015-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cse and nep-hme
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Related works:
Journal Article: Selectivity and Transparency in Social Banking: Evidence from Europe (2016)
Working Paper: Selectivity and Transparency in Social Banking: Evidence from Europe (2016)
Working Paper: Selectivity and Transparency in Social Banking: Evidence from Europe (2016)
Working Paper: Selectivity and Transparency in Social Banking: Evidence from Europe (2016)
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