Age and Choice in Health Insurance: Evidence from Switzerland
Karolin Becker () and
Peter Zweifel ()
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Karolin Becker: Plaut Economics, Olten
Peter Zweifel: Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich
No 410, SOI - Working Papers from Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich
Abstract:
Elements of regulation inherent in most social health insurance systems are a uniform package of benefits and uniform cost sharing. Both elements risk to burden the population with a welfare loss if preferences differ. This suggests introducing more contracted choice; however, it is widely believed that this would not benefit the aged. This study examines the relationship between age and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for additional options in Swiss social health insurance. Through discrete choice experiments (DCE), a marked diversity of preferences can be established. The findings suggest that while the aged do exhibit more status quo bias, they require less rather than more specific compensation for selected cutbacks considered, pointing to potential for contracts that induce self-rationing in return for lower premiums.
Keywords: willingness-to-pay; health insurance; age; rationing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 C93 D61 I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2004-08, Revised 2007-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-hea and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Published in The Patient, 1 (1), 2008, pp. 27-40
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https://www.econ.uzh.ch/apps/workingpapers/wp/wp0410.pdf revised version, 2007 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:soz:wpaper:0410
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