On The Role of Access Charges Under Network Competition

Stefan Buehler and Armin Schmutzler

No 501, SOI - Working Papers from Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich

Abstract: We aim to clarify the role of access charges under two-way network competition, employing a reduced-form approach. Retaining the key features of specific network competition models but imposing less structure, we analyze the impact of changes in access charges on linear and non-linear retail prices. We derive su.cient conditions for usage fees to be increasing (and subscriber charges to be decreasing) in access charges. These conditions are shown to be satisfied only under rather restrictive assumptions on the demand for calls, suggesting that implementing collusion by inflating access charges is likely to be nonfeasible.

Keywords: network competition; two-way access; collusion; nonlinear retail prices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2005-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Dewenter, R. und J. Haucap (Eds.), Access Pricing - Theory and Practice, Elsevier.

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https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/52199/1/wp0501.pdf First version, 2005 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:soz:wpaper:0501

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