Consumer Resistance Against Regulation: The Case of Health Care

Peter Zweifel (), Harry Telser () and Stephan Vaterlaus ()
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Peter Zweifel: Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich
Harry Telser: Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich
Stephan Vaterlaus: Plaut Economics, Olten

No 505, SOI - Working Papers from Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich

Abstract: Regulation fostering Managed Care alternatives in health insurance is spreading. This work reports on an experiment designed to measure the amounts of compensation asked by the Swiss population (in terms of reduced premiums) for Managed-Care type restrictions in the provision of health care. It finds that restrictions on the freedom of physician choice would require an average compensation of more than one-third of the premium, while generic substitution even meets with a small willingness to pay. Marked preference heterogeneity is an argument against regulation imposing uniformity of contract in Swiss social health insurance.

Keywords: health insurance; health care; regulation; preference measurement; discrete choice experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D61 I11 I18 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2005-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-hea, nep-ias and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in Journal of Regulatory Economics 29(3), 2006, pp. 319-332

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:soz:wpaper:0505

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