A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments

Armin Schmutzler

No 601, SOI - Working Papers from Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich

Abstract: Many experimental studies implement two versions of one game for which agents� behavior is fundamentally different even though the Nash prediction is the same. This paper provides a novel explanation of such findings. Starting from the observation that many of the games under consideration satisfy the strategic-complementarity property, I obtain predictions for the direction of adjustment in response to parameter changes which do not require calculation of the equilibrium. I show that these predictions explain the experimental evidence very well. Further, I provide a behavioral justification of the approach, and I explore the relation to alternative explanations based on equilibrium selection theories and the quantal response equilibrium.

Keywords: experimental economics; game theory; Nash equilibrium; embedding method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2006-02, Revised 2008-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Forthcoming in Games and Economic Behaviour

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https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/52361/1/wp0601.pdf revised version, 2008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:soz:wpaper:0601

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