Determinants of Successful Cooperation in a Face-to-Face Social Dilemma

Donja Darai () and Silvia Gr�tz ()
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Silvia Gr�tz: Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich

No 1006, SOI - Working Papers from Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich

Abstract: What makes you a successful cooperator? Using data from the British television game show "Golden Balls" we analyze a prisoner's dilemma game and its pre-play. We find that players strategically select their partner for the PD, e.g., they bear in mind whether contestants lied. Players' expectations about the stake size strongly influence the outcome of the PD: The lower the stakes, the more likely players successfully cooperate. Most interestingly, unilateral cooperation is encouraged by mutually promising not to defect and shaking hands on it, but a mere handshake serves as manipulating device and increases successful defection.

Keywords: prisoner's dilemma; cooperative behavior; communication; promises; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C93 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2010-07, Revised 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/51789/1/wp1006.pdf Revised version, 2010 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:soz:wpaper:1006

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