Lobbying and the Power of Multinational Firms

Andreas Polk, Armin Schmutzler and Adrian Muller ()

No 1008, SOI - Working Papers from Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich

Abstract: Are national or multinational firms better lobbyists? This paper analyzes the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the resulting regulation levels for national and multinational firms. We identify three countervailing forces, the easier-to-shut-down effect, the easier-to-curb-exports effect and the multiple-plant effect. The interplay of these three forces determines whether national or multinational firms produce more, depending on such parameters as the potential environmental damages, transportation costs and the in uence of the firm. We also show that welfare levels are higher with multinational firms than with national firms when there is no lobbying, but that lobbying can reverse the welfare ordering.

Keywords: Multinational enterprises; regulation; policy formation; lobbying; interest groups; foreign direct investment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F23 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2010-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/51791/1/wp1008.pdf first version, 2010 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying and the power of multinational firms (2014)
Working Paper: Lobbying and the Power of Multinational Firms (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:soz:wpaper:1008

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