TWO FOLK MANIPULABILITY THEOREMS IN TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS

Marilda Sotomayor ()

No 2012_28, Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP)

Abstract: We prove two Folk Theorems which, together with the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983)), have stimulated the development of the theory on incentives for the one-to-one two-sided matching models with money as a continuous variable.

Keywords: matching; Stable payoff; competitive equilibrium payoff; optimal stable payoff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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