School Reputation and School Choice in Brazil: a Regression Discontinuity Design
Andrea Lépine ()
No 2015_38, Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP)
Abstract:
The provision of information on schools' performance on standardized tests is expected to generate pressure on schools as students and their families can compare them and make more informed school choices. This paper uses administrative data from Brazil to explore whether the publication of grades obtained at a standardized high school test (the Enem) resulted in changes in enrollments in high and low performing schools, through a sharp regression discontinuity design. The results show that the disclosure of school grades did not result in students reallocating between both types of school, in neither private nor public schools. The findings remain unchanged when I control for the degree of competition faced by schools or their socio-economic environment.
Keywords: School choice; Standardized tests; School accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 I25 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lam and nep-ure
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