THE ROOLE PLAYED BY THE WELL-BEHAVED MATCHINGS IN THE COALITION FORMATION PROCESS OF THE STABLE MATCHINGS FOR THE ROOMMATE MARKET

Marilda Sotomayor ()

No 2016_06, Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP)

Abstract: We approach the roommate problem by focusing on well-behaved matchings, which are those individually rational matchings whose blocking pairs, if any, are formed with unmatched agents. We show that the set of stable matchings is non-empty if and only if no well-behaved and unstable matching is Pareto optimal among all well-behaved matchings. The economic intuition underlying this condition is that blocking can be done so that the transactions at any well-behaved and unstable matching need not be undone as agents reach the the set of stable matchings. We also give a sufficient condition on the preferences of the agents for the non-emptiness of the set of stable matchings. New properties of economic interest are proved

Keywords: Core; Stable matching; well-behaved matching; simple matching. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.repec.eae.fea.usp.br/documentos/MarildaSotomayor_06WP.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spa:wpaper:2016wpecon6

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Pedro Garcia Duarte ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).