Unintended Consequences of Unemployment Insurance: Evidence from Stricter Eligibility Criteria in Brazil

Cristiano C. Carvalho () and Renata Narita Raphael Corbi

No 2017_16, Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP)

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of changes in the eligibility criteria of unemploy- ment benefits (UI) on layoffs in Brazil. We exploit exogenous variation introduced by a reform in the UI system in 2015. Our difference-in-differences estimates show that UI accounts for 11 − 13% of the average dismissal rates of eligible workers. Our results are consistent with workers having the incentive to strategically induce their dismissals in order to collect UI benefits.

Keywords: unemployment insurance; labor legislation; job turnover; layoffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J46 J63 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.repec.eae.fea.usp.br/documentos/Carvalho_Corbi_Narita_16WP.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spa:wpaper:2017wpecon16

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Pedro Garcia Duarte ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).